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 SOLVING THE GOOD-TIME PUZZLE:                          
WHY FOLLOWING THE RULES SHOULD GET YOU     
OUT OF PRISON EARLY 
MICHAEL M. O’HEAR* 
 
Good-time programs have long been an important part of the 
American penal landscape. At least twenty-nine states and the federal 
government currently offer prison inmates early release, sometimes by 
many years, in return for good behavior. Written a generation ago, the 
leading law review article on good time presented a strong case against such 
programs. Although good time is traditionally justified by reference to its 
usefulness in deterring inmate misconduct—credits can be denied or 
withdrawn as a penalty for violations of prison rules—the article questioned 
how it could possibly be just to impose additional incarceration based on 
mere violations of administrative regulations. 
In response to this important challenge, the present Essay proposes a 
new way to conceptualize good-time credits, specifically, as a way to 
recognize atonement. Drawing on communicative theories of punishment, 
the Essay argues that good time can be seen as congruent with (and not, as 
is commonly supposed, in opposition to) the basic purposes of sentencing. 
The Essay then proposes reforms that would help good-time programs more 
fully to embody the atonement model. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1982, Professor James Jacobs provided the first extended 
treatment in the scholarly literature of good-time programs, which offer 
prison inmates early release in return for good behavior.1 Although 
good time was nearly ubiquitous in the United States—Jacobs found 
programs in all but four states2—it was administered entirely behind 
prison walls and hence was “nearly invisible” to the public.3 Given the 
lack of public (and scholarly) attention, Jacobs worried that good time 
would be left untouched by the sentencing reform movement then 
sweeping the nation.4 As he observed, good time seemed fundamentally 
inconsistent with the basic thrust of the sentencing reform agenda, 
which reflected a deep skepticism of both the rehabilitative capacity of 
prisons and the trustworthiness of officials given broad discretionary 
power over criminal offenders.5 In light of these concerns, Jacobs 
canvassed a range of potential justifications for good time, and found 
them all inadequate.6 Good time, he concluded, “should be phased 
out.”7 
Jacobs’ analysis points to a puzzle. When it comes to the judge’s 
decision in selecting a sentence, scholars have given us a 
superabundance of elaborate normative frameworks,8 which are 
 
 1. James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1982). 
 2. Id. at 226. 
 3. Id. at 218–19. 
 4. Id. at 220. 
 5. Id. For a more detailed account of the concerns of sentencing reformers in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, see Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity 
in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 757–77 (2006). 
 6. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 258–69. 
 7. Id. at 221. 
 8. For an overview, see Andrew von Hirsch, Penal Theories, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 659 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998). 
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reflected to varying degrees in the directives of sentencing law.9 In 
most jurisdictions, however, when a judge imposes a prison term, that 
term is only a theoretical maximum; the actual time served will be 
determined to a significant extent through post-sentencing decisions 
made by corrections and parole officials, including those related to 
good time. Yet, scholars have devoted hardly any additional attention to 
good time since Jacobs’ landmark article,10 and the traditional 
justifications for good time are no more impressive today than they 
were in 1982.  
One potential response to this state of affairs is that of Jacobs 
himself: if no persuasive justification has been offered for a common 
and highly consequential practice, then that practice ought to be 
abolished. But the durability of a practice in the face of both stiff 
academic criticism and strong political headwinds ought to give us 
pause. Although not quite so ubiquitous today as it was in 1982, good 
time remains available in twenty-nine states.11 That programs framed in 
terms of “early release” have survived the sentencing severity 
revolution of the past generation seems quite remarkable.12 Indeed, 
 
 9. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (identifying considerations for 
judges to take into account in federal system); O’Hear, supra note 5, at 773 (discussing 
purposes of sentencing embraced by § 3553(a)). 
 10. The most thorough and insightful recent contribution to the good-time 
literature is probably Nora V. Demleitner, Good Conduct Time: How Much and for 
Whom? The Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 777 (2009). Demleitner helpfully updates aspects of Jacobs’ paper and offers a 
much more positive view of good time. See, e.g., id. at 796 (arguing that “good time 
can become a valuable tool”). However, the aims of her paper are different than mine 
in at least two important respects. First, she takes as a given the current high level of 
severity of American punishment, and finds justification for good time, in part, in the 
need to mitigate that severity. Id. By contrast, my aim is to develop a justification that 
is not dependent on the harshness of sentencing practices at any particular moment in 
time. (I think Jacobs rightly questioned, moreover, whether good time actually helps to 
reduce sentence length. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.) Second, Demleitner 
folds together both good time and what is sometimes called “earned time,” that is, 
providing credits toward early release based on participation in rehabilitative 
programming. Demleitner, supra, at 781. My aim, however, is to address pure good 
time (credits for following the rules). Earned-time programs are attractive in principle 
for the reasons that Demleitner identifies, but their viability and practical appeal depend 
on the uncertain willingness of legislatures to allocate sufficient funds for programming 
to be made widely available to inmates. Id. at 782–83. As Jacobs pointed out, where 
programs have long waiting lists, earned time may raise substantial equity concerns. 
Jacobs, supra note 1, at 265–66. 
 11. For a complete list of these states, see infra Appendix. I do not count 
states with only “earned time.” See supra note 10. I also do not count states that offer 
good time only to jail inmates, but not to those incarcerated in prisons (which typically 
house larger numbers and longer-term inmates than jails). 
 12. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 3 (1996) (“Every state 
since 1980 has enacted laws mandating minimum prison sentences based on the 
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good time has persisted even in the federal system,13 which has at least 
arguably become the harshest jurisdiction in the United States.14 Surely, 
good time’s durability warrants a renewed effort to identify a principled 
reason for its existence. There must be something about good time that 
resonates with our intuitions about society’s proper response to criminal 
wrongdoing. Identifying that “something” is the puzzle I address in this 
Essay. 
More specifically, I will show how good-time programs can be 
thought of as an effort to recognize atonement. Although there is a vast 
and ancient literature on atonement as a theological concept,15 
philosophers and legal scholars have more recently begun to develop 
secular theories of atonement and to consider their implications for 
criminal punishment.16 These authors have identified certain widely 
 
premises that harsher penalties will reduce crime rates and that judges cannot otherwise 
be trusted to impose them.”); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 3, 55 (2003) 
(noting near quintupling of U.S. incarcerated population between mid-1970s and 2000). 
 13. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2006). 
 14. See LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 7 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus09.pdf (noting that average annual 
increase in number of federal prisoners from 2000 to 2008 was 4.4%, as compared to 
only 1.5% for state prisoners); Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local 
Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing 
Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 730–33 (2002) (discussing incentive for law-
enforcement officers to choose federal prosecution over state in order to obtain longer 
sentences).  
 15. For a discussion of some of the leading theological views, see LINDA 
RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS 9–10, 27–
30, 61, 69–72 (2009). 
 16. The seminal article in the law review literature is Stephen P. Garvey, 
Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999). The most thorough 
philosophical treatment of atonement is supplied by RADZIK, supra note 15, at 3–5. For 
an earlier effort to apply the atonement model to an important problem in sentencing 
law (that is, discounts for “substantial assistance” to the authorities), see Michael A. 
Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 12, 33–44 (2003) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 
(2002)). There has been a particularly large outpouring of attention in the legal 
scholarship in recent years to remorse and apology, which are both aspects of 
atonement. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse 
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 87–91 (2004); Margareth 
Etienne, Remorse, Responsibility, and Regulating Advocacy: Making Defendants Pay 
for the Sins of Their Lawyers, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2103, 2107–09 (2003); Jeffrie G. 
Murphy, Remorse, Apology, and Mercy, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 185, 185–
95 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009). In addition to the apology literature, at least 
two other burgeoning bodies of literature help to illuminate aspects of atonement and 
how atonement might be made a more central part of society’s response to crime. The 
first is the restorative justice literature. For an introduction to restorative justice and its 
relationship to atonement, see RADZIK, supra note 15, at 153–74. The second is the 
2012:195 Solving the Good-Time Puzzle 199 
held, if often inchoate, moral intuitions regarding the value and content 
of successful atonement. Although none of these scholars address good 
time per se, their work shows how good conduct in prison can be 
regarded as an aspect of an offender’s broader efforts to atone for 
wrongdoing.  
To be clear, I do not claim that good conduct, without more, 
constitutes complete atonement for an offense. Rather, the claim is 
more modest: that good conduct, in the right circumstances, carries at 
least some of the social meaning that we associate with atonement. 
Good conduct, in other words, can have a positive communicative 
character—a character that may serve to mitigate the harmful and 
threatening message conveyed by the underlying criminal offense.  
In order to develop these ideas, I will take a detour into the realm 
of another longstanding puzzle in punishment theory: why do we give a 
“discount” at sentencing to offenders who accept responsibility for their 
offenses? The criteria for acceptance, as articulated in the federal 
sentencing guidelines,17 point to atonement as an important animating 
consideration. Our detour into the acceptance puzzle will thus prove 
helpful in demonstrating a systemic willingness to adjust penal severity 
in light of an offender’s efforts to make amends. But our detour will 
also be useful in another respect, for it will underscore the 
shortcomings of the sentencing hearing as the moment at which to make 
a final decision regarding the offender’s atonement. By taking a broader 
view of when atonement can occur and how it is recognized—as I think 
we do not only through good time, but also through parole, clemency, 
and other post-sentencing proceedings—we provide offenders with 
greater opportunities and encouragement to make amends. In so doing, 
we help to create the conditions in which offenders can be welcomed 
back into full membership in the community without devaluing the 
social norms they violated or the worth of the victims they wronged. 
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates on the nature of 
the good-time puzzle. Part II describes the acceptance puzzle. Part III 
offers atonement as the solution to both puzzles. Part IV considers 
implications of the analysis for the framing and design of good-time 
programs. I conclude with some more general thoughts regarding 
atonement and imprisonment.  
 
literature on communicative theories of punishment, which are discussed below in Part 
III.A. 
 17. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2011). 
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I. THE GOOD-TIME PUZZLE 
The following sections briefly survey the varied landscape of 
good-time law and then explore in more detail Professor Jacobs’ 
important challenge to the justifiability of good time. 
A. Good Time in Practice: Amount, Eligibility, Forfeiture 
The amount of good time available varies considerably by 
jurisdiction, and within some jurisdictions based on offense type and 
other considerations. Seven states offer day-for-day credit or better to 
at least some classes of inmates; in these states, a sentence might 
effectively be cut in half based on good conduct.18 Other states are 
much stingier, awarding only three or four days of credit per month.19 
Still other states have quite elaborate systems that defy easy 
characterization.20 The norm, however, seems to be in the range of ten 
to twenty days per month, or a reduction in sentence length of twenty-
five to forty percent.21  
In general, good time is awarded automatically to eligible inmates, 
although the statutes of two states expressly contemplate an inmate-by-
inmate monthly review as a condition of granting credit.22 Most states 
with good-time programs make credit available to all or nearly all of 
their prison inmates, but other states have adopted a wide range of 
categorical exclusions. For instance, some exclude inmates who have 
committed serious violent or sexual offenses,23 or who have killed a law 
enforcement officer.24 Others require that an inmate work or participate 
 
 18. These states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina (for 
impaired driving offenses only), Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia. For further 
details and statutory citations, see infra Appendix to this Essay. 
 19. Delaware inmates cap out at three days per month, as do South Carolina 
inmates serving time on no-parole offenses, while Maine limits good time to four days 
per month. See infra Appendix. 
 20. Examples include Oklahoma and New Jersey. See infra Appendix.  
 21. Different states express this idea differently. Alaska and New York offer 
one-third off the sentence. Nevada offers a credit of twenty days per month, as does 
South Carolina for paroleable offenses. Colorado and Wyoming offer a credit of fifteen 
days per month. New Hampshire offers a credit of 12.5 days per month. Kentucky, 
Maryland, and Rhode Island offer a credit of ten days per month. South Dakota offers a 
credit of either four or six months per year, depending on the length of the sentence. 
See infra Appendix.  
 22. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:22(I) (2007 & Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 41-21-236(a)(3) (2010). 
 23. Louisiana and Maine are examples. See infra Appendix. 
 24. OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 138(A) (2004). 
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in an education or rehabilitative program in order to be eligible for 
good time.25 
Once awarded, credits may be forfeited for misconduct. Normally, 
any fresh criminal offense committed in prison or any violation of 
prison rules will suffice. A few states limit forfeiture by statute to more 
serious violations.26 Other states, however, are even more expansive 
than the norm in what can lead to forfeiture. New York, for instance, 
authorizes forfeiture for “bad behavior” and “failure to perform 
properly . . . [assigned] duties.” 27 Once forfeiture is ordered, 
corrections officials have broad discretion in determining how much 
good time to take away.28 In some states, officials may even order the 
 
 25. States falling into this category include Massachusetts, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and Texas. See infra Appendix. These states blur the distinction between 
“good time” and “earned time.” I have classified them as good-time states because the 
additional requirements beyond following the rules do not seem especially rigorous, for 
instance, requiring only “participation” in one of a range of different activities (as 
opposed to requiring successful completion of a program). The Missouri and Texas 
statutes also include some notable hedging language. In Missouri, inmates must “take[] 
advantage of the programs . . . available to him,” MO. REV. STAT. § 558.041(3) 
(2000), while Texas corrections officials may excuse inmates from the participation 
requirement if “the inmate is not capable of participating,” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
498.003(a) (West 2004). 
 26. For instance, New Jersey’s statute speaks in terms of “flagrant 
misconduct,” and Michigan’s of “major misconduct.” See infra Appendix. Such terms, 
however, may be considerably more expansive in their reach than might first appear to 
be the case. For instance, in Michigan, “major misconduct” includes such potentially 
low-level offenses as “[d]isobeying a direct order,” “[i]nterference with the 
administration of rules,” “[i]nsolence,” “[f]ailure to maintain employment,” being 
“[o]ut of place,” and “possession of gambling paraphernalia.” MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
791.5513(1)(c) (1999). 
 27. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803(1)(a) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012). In 
South Dakota, inmates may lose good time “for conduct evincing an intent to 
reoffend,” and sex offenders for “fail[ing] to fully cooperate with all treatment 
offered.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 24-2-18 (2004 & Supp. 2011). In Texas, forfeiture is 
required for inmates who contact minor victims or their family members. TEX. GOV’T 
CODE ANN. § 498.0042 (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). In twelve states (Delaware, 
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, 
Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia), good time may be forfeited for filing a 
“frivolous lawsuit.” See infra Appendix. 
 28. This discretion is limited by statute in some states in a variety of ways. 
For instance, Delaware specifies that all good time is lost when certain inmates are 
convicted of a fresh crime. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4382(a) (2007). Rhode Island 
has a simple day-for-day rule: “[f]or every day [that] a prisoner [is] shut up or 
otherwise disciplined for bad conduct . . . there shall be deducted one day” from the 
prisoner’s good-conduct time. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(c) (Supp. 2011). Illinois caps 
forfeiture at one year per infraction, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(c) (West 2007 & 
Supp. 2011), and Louisiana at 180 days, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4(B) (2005 & 
Supp. 2011). 
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loss of good time that has not yet been earned.29 In many states, they 
also have discretion either to restore lost good time30 or to suspend 
forfeitures.31 In any event, the decision-making procedures are internal, 
administrative procedures, without the protections normally associated 
with criminal trials.32 
B. The Challenge to Good Time 
Jacobs’ critique of good time advanced two distinct types of 
argument. The less important, at least for present purposes, challenged 
the amount of discretionary authority given to largely unaccountable 
prison officials, particularly at the level of the individual institution.33 
 
 29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-301(4) (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-7a(c) 
(2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.045(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 17-A, § 1253(9)(B) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 30. ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(f)(2) (2011); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(5)(c) 
(2007 & Supp. 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-709(c) (LexisNexis 2008); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5) (1998 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-
A:22(IV)(c) (2007 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 138(A) (2004 & Supp. 
2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 421.121(4) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(d) (2006); W. 
VA. CODE § 28-5-27(f) (2008); DIV. OF PRISONS, N. C. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY & 
PROCEDURE, ch. B, § .0111(c) (May 31, 2011), available at 
http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/policy_procedure_manual/b0100.pdf. 
 31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4382(b) (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
498.004(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). 
 32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(f)(2) (2011) (Commissioner of the 
Department of Corrections decides based on evidence submitted by the warden in 
charge); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-301(3) (2006) (“[G]ood time authorized . . . shall 
not vest and may be withheld or deducted by the department.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
17-A, § 1253(9)(B) (2006) (“Any portion of the time deducted from the sentence . . . 
may be withdrawn by the chief administrative officer of the state facility . . . .”); MD. 
CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-709 (LexisNexis 2008) (“If an inmate violates the 
applicable rules of discipline, the Division [of Correction] may revoke a portion or all 
of the diminution credits . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 209.451(3) (2011) (“The decision 
of the director regarding a forfeiture is final.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-140 (West 
2008) (“In case of any flagrant misconduct the board of managers may declare a 
forfeiture . . . as to them shall seem just.”); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 560–62, 568–70 (1974) (holding that Due Process Clause requires fewer 
procedural protections in connection with loss of good time than in connection with 
revocation of parole; inmates do not have right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses or right to counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings). 
 33. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 218–20. Professor Klingele has recently echoed 
these same criticisms in arguing that judicial sentence modification is preferable to good 
time and other mechanisms that put release authority in the hands of corrections or 
parole officials. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence without Hiding the Truth: 
Judicial Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 465, 515 (2010). 
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Jacobs worried about abuse of power34 and unwarranted disparities in 
the treatment of different inmates.35 Although his concerns seem well 
justified for many good-time programs as they are currently structured, 
they do not speak to good time as a concept—the basic idea that time 
served ought to be reduced based on good conduct. There is nothing in 
this concept that requires the sort of wide, decentralized discretion that 
Jacobs described. There is no reason, for instance, why vague legal 
standards cannot be replaced with the sort of specific guidelines that 
have replaced unlimited judicial sentencing discretion in many 
jurisdictions.36 Likewise, greater formality could be required at 
disciplinary hearings and more searching external review authorized, 
either in the court system or by a centralized authority in the 
corrections system that would be independent from the institution-level 
power structure.37  
Jacobs’ second major theme, however, strikes closer to the heart 
of the good-time concept. His argument was premised on the view that 
good-time denials and forfeitures are de facto sentencing decisions—
they result in longer periods of incarceration based on findings of 
misconduct. Even assuming this sentencing power was not used 
vindictively, Jacobs argued that there was still a fundamental problem: 
the good-time system resulted in incremental criminal punishment being 
imposed for violations of administrative regulations.38 He observed, “It 
is important to emphasize that prison regulations cover the totality of 
human conduct—e.g., personal grooming, possessions, smoking, 
talking, reading materials, working, sex practices, and inmate-staff and 
inmate-inmate relations.”39 With the extraordinary reach of prison 
regulations in mind, Jacobs criticized the imposition of extra prison 
time on an inmate for conduct that would not count as criminal if 
committed outside prison walls: 
One tends to think of prison officials using good time to deter 
and punish serious misbehaviors like stabbing, rape, and 
arson—all of which are, of course, also felony offenses under 
 
 34. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 1, at 261 (expressing concern about prison 
officials denying credits to “[n]onconformists and those who for any reason antagonized 
the officials”). 
 35. Id. at 256. 
 36. See TONRY, supra note 12, at 25–30 (describing implementation of 
guidelines in about half the states). 
 37. If this level of due process is impractical in routine matters, then it could 
at least be made available in cases involving the largest losses of good time (say, more 
than sixty days), where the abuse concerns are greatest. 
 38. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 261. 
 39. Id. at 234. 
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state law. But using good time to deter and punish lesser, 
nonfelonious behavior—cursing at a guard, refusing to work, 
being in the wrong cell, engaging in consensual homosexual 
behavior—should trouble us. The most disturbing fact is that 
prison officials are vested with the authority to impose six-
month, one-year, or longer prison terms for this kind of 
misbehavior.40 
Given its impact on time served, Jacobs properly demanded some 
justification for good time—precisely as we should demand justification 
for any program that imposes the “very severe sanction” of 
imprisonment.41 So what was the justification for good time? Jacobs 
considered three traditionally important candidates.42  
First, as Jacobs observed, prison officials frequently defended 
good time as a way to maintain order and discipline.43 The underlying 
assumption is that the threatened loss of good time deters prison 
misconduct. Although this assumption is at least facially plausible, 
Jacobs argued that “the use of good time to enforce discipline and 
maintain control is unnecessary and, even if necessary, illegitimate.”44 
Jacobs questioned, “Does the threat of good time forfeiture deter any 
behavior not already deterred by threats of loss of privileges, 
segregation, parole denial, and prosecution?”45 And, even if there were 
 
 40. Id. at 260–61. Moreover, even when criminal misconduct was at issue, 
Jacobs still saw a problem: 
If [prison officials] suspect a crime has been committed, why should they 
not be required to have the accusation tested in court? The response usually 
given is that such cases are hard to prosecute and often end in acquittal. 
This puts the matter nicely. Good time revocation is considered a legitimate 
punishment because it is a way, in effect, to impose a criminal sentence 
which otherwise could not be imposed. 
Id. at 260. 
 41. Id. at 259. 
 42. Jacobs considered five possible justifications in all. Id. at 258–69. 
However, two of these candidates (mitigating sentence severity and providing a safety 
valve for prison overcrowding) seem so similar that I will group them together here. 
The fifth possibility, that good conduct reveals a “good character” that deserves 
reduced punishment, has not been a commonly articulated justification for good time 
and, as Jacobs observed, seems quite out of step with modern desert theory. Id. at 266. 
Because it is so obviously weaker than the other candidates, I’ll not discuss it further 
here. 
 43. Id. at 258. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 259. He seemed particularly dubious that forfeiture threats add 
anything to segregation threats: 
My impression, from years of prison research, is that disciplinary 
segregation is perceived by prisoners to be the most important intra-prison 
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some marginal deterrence, Jacobs doubted that the benefits of avoided 
rule violations could justify the harsh consequences of loss of good 
time. He observed, “Capital punishment might deter prison rule 
violations, but most of us would rule out its use for administrative 
infractions.”46 
Second, there was the incapacitation justification: “It is argued that 
failures to conform to rules and to participate effectively in prison 
programs should be punished by lengthening prison sentences because 
such failures indicate that the prisoner is unwilling to live a crime-free 
life outside prison.”47 As Jacobs pointed out, however, behavior in the 
“quintessentially abnormal environment” of prison might actually have 
little value when one is trying to predict post-prison behavior: 
Those individuals incapable of coping with the extraordinary 
pressures of prison life may cope well enough with the 
stresses of everyday life on the streets. On the other hand, 
there are many individuals who have learned to survive and 
even “prosper” in prison who cannot or will not adhere to the 
rules imposed by our larger society.48 
Finally, there was the argument that good time accomplishes a 
necessary bit of political sleight-of-hand—a reconciliation of 
“conflicting impulses.”49 On the one hand, the public seems to demand 
long prison sentences, but, on the other, seems equally unwilling to 
spend adequate sums to build and properly maintain enough prisons to 
house everyone who is sent away. Against this backdrop, good time 
serves as a “[l]ow-visibility release mechanism[]” that “allow[s] 
 
punishment . . . . [T]he imposition of segregative confinement has an 
immediate and negative effect on the rule violator. By comparison, 
revoking good time is a kind of paper punishment. 
Id. at 258–59. 
 46. Id. at 259. 
 47. Id. at 264. This viewpoint helped to fuel the adoption of good-time laws in 
many states during the Progressive Era. CRAIG HANEY, REFORMING PUNISHMENT: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL LIMITS TO THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 41 (2006). 
 48. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 264. In terms of addressing recidivism risk, there 
may be a distinction to be made between “good time” (my subject and Jacobs’) and 
“earned time.” (For a comparison of these terms, see supra note 10.) There is a 
growing body of evidence indicating that successful participation in some types of 
prison-based programming does reduce recidivism risk. Dora Schriro, Is Good Time a 
Good Idea? A Practitioner’s Perspective, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 179, 179–80 (2009). 
For this reason, the case for earned time may be stronger than the case for good time. 
On the other hand, earned-time programs will likely always be hampered by the 
scarcity of resources for high-quality prison programs and the objection that criminal 
offenders should not be first in line to receive any of our limited social-service dollars. 
 49. Jacobs, supra note 1, at 262. 
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politicians to promise stiff sentences while shielding the public from the 
social and economic costs of more imprisonment.”50  
Yet, as Jacobs argued, the implicit deception was hardly ethically 
attractive,51 and, in any event, seemed unlikely to fool a public bent on 
harsher punishment over the long run. Indeed, concerns over public 
perceptions might lead to decisions by legislators, sentencing judges, 
and corrections officials that could effectively undermine the goal of 
using good time to mitigate severity.52 Judges, for instance, might 
inflate nominal sentence lengths so as to offset anticipated good-time 
reductions.53 
In sum, Jacobs raised important, and still not effectively 
addressed, objections to each of the traditional justifications for good 
time. His arguments suggest a need either to abandon good time (as 
many, but not most, good-time states did in the wake of his article) or 
to identify a fresh justification. 
II. THE ACCEPTANCE PUZZLE 
Although Jacobs and others who have written about good time 
have not previously made the connection, there is a remarkably similar 
puzzle with respect to the sentence discount for acceptance of 
responsibility. Sentencing judges routinely reduce sentence length based 
on acceptance.54 For instance, the federal sentencing guidelines (which 
will be my focus here)55 call for reducing sentence length by more than 
one-quarter if the defendant is found to have accepted responsibility (an 
amount that is notably close to the typical good-time discount).56 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 263. 
 53. Jacobs might have gone a step further and questioned whether good time 
might not lead to longer amounts of time served overall, which could result if multiple 
institutional players (legislature, judiciary, corrections) independently tried to “correct 
for” good time without taking into account the actions of others. 
 54. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (indicating that 94.9% of federal defendants had their 
sentences reduced on this basis in fiscal year 2010). 
 55. Although the federal system has the most clearly and precisely structured 
standards for acceptance, the discount is also recognized in state systems. See, e.g., 
State v. Strupp, No. 2010AP1806-CR, slip op. at 6 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2011), 
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/ 
DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=69082 (approving sentencing judge’s 
consideration of fact that defendant showed “a lack of remorse or sense of 
responsibility for his actions”). 
 56. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2010). The guideline 
offers a two- or three-level reduction for acceptance. The effect of this reduction on 
minimum sentence length varies depending on where a defendant is on the guidelines 
2012:195 Solving the Good-Time Puzzle 207 
The acceptance discount is often thought of as a guilty-plea 
discount, and there can be no doubt that a guilty plea is normally an 
essential component of acceptance. The federal guideline expresses the 
close relationship between the guilty plea and the acceptance discount 
as follows: “This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant 
who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the 
essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits 
guilt and expresses remorse.”57 
Data on actual federal sentencing practices bear out the closeness 
of the relationship with the vast majority of defendants who plead guilty 
receiving the discount.58 
In light of the plea-acceptance relationship, I have suggested 
elsewhere that the acceptance discount might best be thought of in the 
“cooperation paradigm,” providing incentives for defendants to act in a 
manner that facilitates the efficient administration of the criminal justice 
system.59 Indeed, the current federal acceptance provision had its origin 
in a proposal to provide an automatic discount for guilty pleas, 
reflecting Sentencing Commission research indicating that defendants 
who pled guilty received sentence reductions that averaged between 
thirty and forty percent.60 Many commentators viewed this discount as a 
practical necessity for a system that required high rates of guilty pleas 
in order to process burgeoning case loads.61 
Yet, the Commission did not adopt the automatic plea discount. In 
itself, a guilty plea is neither necessary nor sufficient for the acceptance 
discount.62 The Commission’s reasoning, although a bit obtuse, 
provides insight into the true nature of acceptance. In the words of the 
Commission’s then-Chair, the automatic discount would have resulted 
 
“grid,” but typically results in a reduction between one-quarter and one-third. See id. at 
ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl. (setting forth the grid). 
 57. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2.  
 58. Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of 
Responsibility”: The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1539 (1997) (discussing study 
showing that eighty-eight percent of defendants pleading guilty received the discount, 
while only twenty percent of those going to trial did). 
 59. Id. at 1511. 
 60. Id. at 1512–13. 
 61. Id. at 1513. 
 62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (“Conviction by 
trial, however, does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such 
a reduction.”); id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3 (“A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not 
entitled to an adjustment under this section as a matter of right.”). 
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in “unjustified windfalls” to some defendants and “would not be in 
keeping with the public’s perception of justice.”63 
This reasoning echoes Jacobs’ critique of good time. No one 
would question the practical value to the criminal justice system of 
defendants pleading guilty and inmates obeying prison rules, but the 
reward held out to incentivize the desired behavior seems inappropriate, 
particularly if one thinks in terms of the relative position of the person 
who does not get the reward. Additional incarceration—measured in 
many months or even years—hardly seems on its face a just and 
proportionate response either to the inconvenience of a trial or to the 
disruption created by a minor rule violation in prison. Incarceration is 
punishment, and, as the Commission recognized, we intuitively feel 
that punishment should be imposed by reference to a criminal offense, 
not merely by what serves the convenience of the State. In both 
contexts—good time and acceptance—there must be something else 
going on besides mere convenience. 
III. ATONEMENT AS THE SOLUTION 
In this Part, I draw a connection between good time and 
acceptance, on the one hand, and the dynamics of wrongdoing and 
reconciliation, on the other. Atonement, I argue, might be that 
“something else” that provides a morally satisfactory justification for 
our good-time and acceptance practices.  
A. The Communicative Theory of Atonement 
Although the term “atonement” has a wide range of different 
connotations in theology and philosophy, I will draw primarily on the 
philosopher Linda Radzik’s reconciliation theory of atonement.64 Her 
work, in turn, relies on communicative theories of wrongdoing and 
punishment, which have become increasingly influential in recent years 
among scholars of criminal law.65 On the communicative view, 
 
 63. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, 
Role of the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 191 (1988). The automatic 
discount was also rejected based on concerns regarding the constitutionality of what 
might be regarded as a nondiscretionary penalty to be imposed on a defendant for 
exercising his right to a trial. O’Hear, supra note 58, at 1513. 
 64. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 75–109. 
 65. For a description of these theories and a consideration of how they relate 
to other theories of punishment, see Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A 
New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1253–59 
(2011). 
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wrongdoing constitutes an insult to the victim, an implicit statement that 
the victim has a lesser value than the offender.66 This insult, moreover, 
may carry something of the character of a threat:  
The wrongful act functions as a kind of testimony that this 
sort of treatment of the victim is acceptable. If the victims 
believe that testimony, if any observers of the wrong believe 
it, or if the wrongdoers themselves are encouraged by the 
apparent acceptance of their claim to superiority, then further 
wrongs and further harms become more likely.67 
If we focus specifically on criminal wrongdoing, we can think of 
the insult and the threat as being made not only to an individual victim, 
but also more broadly to a community. To the extent that a 
community’s most fundamental social norms are embodied in its 
criminal law, the commission of a crime communicates something 
negative about and to the community. The criminal offender acts as if 
he is above the community’s norms, thus threatening the community’s 
ability to rely on compliance with its norms and ultimately its sense of 
security, cohesion, and trust. 
The goal of atonement is reconciliation—a restoration of 
relationships that is accomplished by addressing the communicative 
harms of crime in morally suitable ways. As Radzik puts it, “When a 
wrongdoer atones, he gives his victim good reason to stop structuring 
their relationship to one another in terms of the roles of wrongdoer and 
victim . . . . The victim will have good reason to give up her 
resentment, fear, and distrust of the wrongdoer.”68 
Apology is a familiar form or aspect of atonement: 
To apologize is to correct the false claim about the victim’s 
value and to withdraw the insult and the threat. When the 
offender properly apologizes for wrongdoing, he 
acknowledges that the victim deserves to have been treated 
better. He offers the injured party a gesture of respect. In 
showing his remorse, he lets the victim know that he does not 
take his mistake lightly but is instead emotionally moved by 
it.69 
 
 66. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 76. 
 67. Id. at 77. 
 68. Id. at 82 (footnotes omitted). 
 69. Id. at 94. For a similar communicative account of apology’s value, see 
Murphy, supra note 16, at 188. 
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To be sure, not all apologies succeed equally well as atonement, 
and something more than an apology may be necessary to atone for 
some offenses. There may even be some offenses that are so serious 
that full atonement is not possible. However, even partial atonement 
may have communicative value; there seems no reason why the worth 
of apologies and other efforts to make amends must be assessed in all-
or-nothing terms.70  
B. Atonement and the Acceptance Puzzle 
This Section considers the acceptance discount from the 
perspective of the atonement model. I first highlight the apologetic (and 
hence atoning) character of acceptance and then explain why we might 
want to reward apology at sentencing. 
1. ACCEPTANCE AS APOLOGY 
The acceptance discount, as described in the federal guidelines, 
contemplates that sentencing judges will evaluate the apologetic quality 
of defendants’ words and deeds prior to and during the sentencing 
hearing—this is that “something extra” beyond just the fact of a guilty 
plea that must be considered. To be sure, I do not mean to claim that 
acceptance (as understood in federal practice) implies a perfect or 
morally ideal apology. What the philosopher Nick Smith calls a 
“categorical apology” is rare in our social lives,71 and we do not 
demand one for the acceptance discount any more than we normally 
demand one in other circumstances of wrongdoing.72 But we do require 
a set of words and deeds that are at least not inconsistent with much of 
the social meaning associated with the term “apology.” If satisfied, this 
requirement permits us to see the entry of a guilty plea and related 
statements by the defendant as a form of partial atonement. 
Consider, for instance, what Smith identifies as the elements of a 
categorical apology73—most of these find expression in federal law and 
practice relating to guilty pleas and the acceptance discount. 
 
 70. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 84. 
 71. NICK SMITH, I WAS WRONG: THE MEANINGS OF APOLOGIES 17 (2008). 
 72. Cf. id. at 24 (“Approximations of categorical apologies—gestures that do 
not provide certain of the available kinds of apologetic meaning—can prove meaningful 
in their own right.”). 
 73. Id. at 140–42. 
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a. Wrongdoer’s personal performance of the apology  
Consistent with Smith’s model,74 the guilty plea is entered by the 
defendant in person, rather than through an attorney or other proxy.75 
Likewise, the defendant has a right to address the court personally at 
sentencing,76 which is often used as an occasion for expressing 
remorse.77 
b. Corroborated factual record  
The guideline states, “a defendant who falsely denies, or 
frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be 
true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of 
responsibility.”78 Moreover, the defendant’s truthful admission of the 
offense and relevant conduct is listed as an appropriate consideration in 
the acceptance determination.79 
c. Identification of harm and acceptance of blame (moral responsibility) 
In some cases, the relevant harm will be an element of the crime, 
as in a homicide case. Likewise, the key blame-related considerations 
(proximate causation of harm and culpable mental state) may also be 
offense elements. To the extent that harm, proximate causation, and 
culpability are elements, the defendant’s guilty plea will constitute an 
identification of harm and acceptance of blame. In cases in which the 
guilty plea does not provide a full identification of harm or acceptance 
of blame, some or all of the missing considerations may be 
encompassed by the guidelines’ concept of relevant conduct,80 which, as 
 
 74. I combine here two of Smith’s elements, possession of appropriate 
standing and performance of the apology. Id. at 74, 141–42, 207. 
 75. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring court to address the defendant 
“personally” before accepting guilty plea). 
 76. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (requiring sentencing judge to 
“address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present 
any information to mitigate the sentence”). 
 77. Mark W. Bennett, Heartstrings or Heartburn: A Federal Judge’s Musings 
on Defendants’ Right and Rite of Allocution, CHAMPION, Mar. 2011, at 26, 26–29. 
 78. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A) (2010). 
 79. Id. Of course, even before sentencing, the defendant will normally 
specifically agree to a factual basis when entering a guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11(b)(3) (requiring factual basis before judge accepts guilty plea). 
 80. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(3) (2010) (defining 
relevant conduct to include “all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions [for 
which the defendant was responsible] . . . and all harm that was the object of such acts 
and omissions”). 
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noted above, must normally be truthfully admitted, or at least not 
falsely denied, in order for a defendant to get acceptance.81  
d. Reform and redress  
As considerations in determining whether there has been 
acceptance, the guideline includes “voluntary termination or withdrawal 
from criminal conduct or associations;”82 “voluntary payment of 
restitution prior to the adjudication of guilt;”83 and “post-offense 
rehabilitative efforts.”84 
e. Proper intentions and emotions  
Although the guideline does not directly address these 
considerations, they seem implicit in two provisions. First, the 
guideline specifies that acceptance is not to be awarded to the defendant 
who is convicted at trial “and only then admits guilt and expresses 
remorse.”85 Although the guideline does not explain this restriction, it 
likely reflects an understanding that the already-convicted defendant has 
nothing to lose in admitting guilt and expressing remorse, which means 
that the admissions are probably self-interested and the expressions 
insincere. Second, the guideline states that “[t]he sentencing judge is in 
a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility.”86 While this assertion also remains unexplained, it is 
likely premised on the standard explanation for the superiority of trial 
judges in fact-finding, that is, the trial judge’s access to demeanor 
evidence, which is thought to permit more reliable credibility 
determinations.87 The guideline’s particular emphasis on the sentencing 
judge’s “unique position” thus seems to reflect an assumption that the 
judge’s assessment of the defendant’s sincerity will play an important 
role in the acceptance calculus. This, in any event, has been the widely 
accepted view of the federal appellate courts.88 
 
 81. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79. 
 82. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(B) (2010). 
 83. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(C). 
 84. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(G). 
 85. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. 
 86. Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5. 
 87. See Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentences: Reconsidering 
Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 2141 (2010) (discussing link between 
access to demeanor evidence and appellate deference). 
 88. See O’Hear, supra note 58, at 1524 (“Virtually all appellate case law on 
the subject equates acceptance of responsibility with remorse . . . .”). 
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This is not to say, of course, that all of these apologetic 
considerations are routinely a matter of rigorous inquiry; that would 
probably be too much to expect of busy district judges.89 Particularly 
against a backdrop of quite severe sentencing guidelines, as well as the 
judge’s self-interest in facilitating plea deals to reduce docket pressures, 
the temptation must be great indeed to award the acceptance discount to 
just about anyone who pleads guilty as a matter of course, and there’s 
not much to prevent district judges from doing so.90 But the doctrinal 
elaboration of the acceptance discount, in both the guidelines and the 
appellate jurisprudence, does point to an ideal form of acceptance that 
seems distinctly apologetic in character. 
2. WHY APOLOGY MATTERS 
Why should an apology get an offender a reduced sentence? An 
early draft of the guidelines suggested one possibility, asserting that 
acceptance of responsibility “is a sound indicator of rehabilitative 
potential.”91 However, there is little evidence that apologies actually 
help to predict recidivism,92 and the Commission dropped express 
mention of rehabilitative potential in the final version of the 
guidelines.93  
Another possible explanation for apology’s appeal is that we 
associate apology with painful emotions, like remorse and shame. 
Perhaps the apologetic defendant requires less incarceration because he 
has already suffered in some significant way prior to the term of 
imprisonment; this suffering diminishes the need for additional hard 
treatment to achieve retributive or deterrent ends. There may be some 
merit to this line of thinking, but it is not clear that the apologetic 
emotions are on balance any more negative than the defiant emotions, 
such as anger and resentment. Indeed, we often speak of apology as an 
 
 89. See United States v. Knight, 905 F.2d 189, 192 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(expressing doubt, in light of high number of acceptance discounts granted, whether 
district courts are normally looking for anything more than guilty plea). 
 90. See O’Hear, supra note 58, at 1538–39 (discussing use of acceptance in 
District of Connecticut as a way to soften perceived harshness of guidelines, and 
institutional dynamics that reinforce tendency to make acceptance nearly automatic 
when the defendant pleads guilty). 
 91. Id. at 1514–15 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY DRAFT 
OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES § B321 commentary (Sept. 1986)). 
 92. Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 106; see also David Eagleman, 
The Brain on Trial, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2011, at 112, 121 (discussing study showing 
that recidivism risk of sex offenders does not correlate with low remorse or denial of 
the crime). 
 93. O’Hear, supra note 58, at 1521. 
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“unburdening,” suggesting that apology may be less a cause of negative 
emotional states than an opportunity for release.94 
A more persuasive account of apology’s appeal comes from 
atonement theory. An apology functions as at least a partial withdrawal 
of the insult and the threat to the victim and the community, and 
thereby mitigates some of the harm and anxiety created by a criminal 
offense. By contrast, we may imagine an overtly defiant offender as 
compounding the original wrong by reaffirming the insult and the 
threat.95 Viewed this way, it is easier to see why the acceptance 
discount is justified: the offender who accepts responsibility is treated 
differently than the otherwise similar offender who remains defiant, not 
merely because the former offers a convenience to those who 
administer the criminal justice system, but because he deserves a less 
severe sentence. 
3. RECONCILING THE ACCEPTANCE DISCOUNT AND THE 
COMMUNICATIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
Although I think there is some intuitive appeal to this desert claim, 
it may help to unpack the view of punishment that underlies it. Under 
communicative theories, a criminal is punished because “to mean what 
we say in condemning some conduct as wrong is to be committed to 
censuring those who engage in it”; “such a response is owed both to the 
victims of such wrongs and to their perpetrators.”96 If criminal 
wrongdoing communicates an insult and a threat to the immediate 
victim and to the community more broadly, punishment is necessary to 
communicate a countervailing message of reassurance, reaffirming the 
moral worth of both the victim and the social norms of the community 
and offering a greater sense of security to those who feel threatened by 
criminal wrongdoing. Punishment also communicates to the offender 
the wrongfulness of his conduct and the need for atonement, in the hope 
that the offender will eventually be reconciled with the victim and the 
wider community.97  
The difficulty lies in the need for proportionality between the 
offense and the punishment. “To punish [an offender] with 
disproportionate severity, or leniency, is to communicate to her more, 
 
 94. See, e.g., Allison D. Redlich et al., Comparing True and False 
Confessions among Persons with Serious Mental Illness, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
394, 407, 410 (2011) (reporting results of study of defendants who confessed; when 
asked about experiencing sense of relief, subjects’ average response was 4.19, with “1” 
meaning “not at all” and “7” meaning “very much so”). 
 95. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 77. 
 96. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 72 (2001). 
 97. Id. at 107, 109. 
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or less, censure than she deserves.”98 Antony Duff, a leading 
communicative theorist, contends that this understanding of punishment 
precludes sentence reductions based on anything the offender does after 
the commission of the crime; such reductions arguably undermine the 
message that punishment is supposed to communicate regarding the 
severity of the offense.99 However, as Duff concedes, current practices 
commonly do recognize repentance as a basis for earlier release from 
prison.100 These practices, I think, reflect an intuitive sense that 
adjusting penal severity based on atonement has a compelling 
communicative justification in its own right. 
This justification has two dimensions. First, atonement—even 
partial atonement—helps to address the needs that are served by 
punishment. If the offender has already performed acts with an atoning 
character, then the threat and the insult should be seen as at least 
partially withdrawn. The victim and the community do not require as 
strong a message of reassurance from the state. Nor does the offender 
require quite so forceful a reminder of his need to atone. Lenience thus 
seems less likely to amplify the offender’s underlying insult and threat 
to the victim and the community, as it might if offered to a thoroughly 
unrepentant offender, or to undermine the message that the offender 
ought to make amends.  
Second, a failure to recognize atonement would itself communicate 
unsuitable messages about the offender and the community. 
Communicative punishment is premised on the moral agency of the 
offender—the offender’s capacity to listen to and be swayed by the 
community’s censure. But to discount at sentencing any indications that 
the offender has already recognized the need for atonement seems 
contrary to this premise. As Radzik puts it, “[n]ot to recognize and 
nurture moral progress is to deny moral agency.”101 She discusses, 
moreover, the idea that an inability to respond favorably to atonement 
reflects a view about the indestructability of wrongdoing that is 
corrosive of social trust and cooperation.102 Carried to an extreme, an 
unrelenting severity in punishment may produce even more anxiety and 
prove even more socially immobilizing than a persistent and 
unwarranted lenience in punishment. By contrast, recognizing 
atonement at sentencing may help to communicate a message that 
 
 98. Id. at 132. 
 99. Id. at 120. Duff makes an exception for “immediate repentance” after 
commission of the crime, insofar as such repentance mitigates the severity of the crime 
itself. Id. at 120–21. 
 100. Id. at 120. 
 101. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 131. 
 102. Id. at 129–31. 
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forgiveness is possible and desirable—a message that may be a 
necessary lubricant for constructive social relationships.103 
These, then, are the concerns and beliefs that I think underlie our 
sense that acceptance of responsibility (seen as an apology or a form of 
partial atonement) merits a reduced sentence. But this solution to the 
acceptance puzzle raises another question, the consideration of which is 
necessary before we can move on to the good-time puzzle. 
C. Why Only a Discount for Acceptance? 
If acceptance of responsibility is a form of atonement, then why 
doesn’t acceptance obviate the need for any state-imposed 
condemnation at all? We could imagine not merely an acceptance 
discount, but acceptance as an alternative to conviction and punishment. 
Indeed, something of this character does seem to happen in our nation’s 
increasingly ubiquitous drug treatment courts and restorative justice 
programs, as offenders who admit wrongdoing and engage in various 
apologetic and reparative activities are given a path out of conventional 
criminal case-processing.104 Although harder to document 
systematically, it also surely happens in informal ways through the 
exercise of police and prosecutorial discretion, with no-charge decisions 
influenced by perceptions of remorse and efforts to make amends. But 
when charges are pursued through conviction, the expectation is that 
acceptance will serve at most as a discount, and not as a basis for 
eliminating punishment entirely.105 
Case severity likely provides a partial explanation. When a case 
does proceed to conviction and then to a conventional sentencing, that 
fact is a good indication that the case is one in which full atonement 
would be quite demanding of the offender. For instance, drug treatment 
courts and restorative justice programs typically screen out the most 
 
 103. See id. at 129 (“[I]f we consider moral trust to be the sort of thing that 
cannot be deserved and cannot be re-earned after wrongdoing, we will all be the worse 
off for it.”); see also Janet Ainsworth, The Social Meaning of Apology, in CRIMINAL 
LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 16, at 201, 203 (“[W]e need apologies and 
expressions of remorse to matter at sentencing because they are as necessary for us as 
for the defendant.”). 
 104. For a description of drug treatment courts, see Michael M. O’Hear, 
Rethinking Drug Courts: Restorative Justice as a Response to Racial Injustice, 20 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 478–79 (2009). For a description of restorative justice 
programs, see id. at 488–89. 
 105. Cf. United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(affirming district court’s decision not to grant further sentence reduction based on 
“extraordinary acceptance of responsibility”); United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 
1290–91 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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serious cases.106 And what may seem “good enough” to justify 
withholding conventional punishment in minor cases may seem far less 
satisfactory as atonement for severe wrongdoing. 
It is important, moreover, to bear in mind the many procedural 
constraints of the criminal justice system that make it highly unlikely 
that an offender in a serious case will be able to offer anything 
approaching full atonement before sentence is imposed. Consider the 
difficulties.107  
For instance, reparations are an important aspect of atonement in 
cases of significant victimization.108 In some cases, symbolic 
reparations, as through an apology, may be sufficient, but, in others, 
something of a more material character may be important. However, 
the material circumstances of many offenders will put monetary 
reparations out of reach during the relatively brief time between offense 
and sentencing, particularly taking into account periods of pre-trial and 
pre-sentencing confinement, when income-earning will be impossible; 
the costs of making bail; the costs of retaining legal assistance if it is 
not provided by the state; and the imposition of fines, forfeitures, and 
court costs.109  
To be sure, the guilty plea may have something of a reparative 
character that goes beyond the merely symbolic. The plea saves the 
community the expense of a trial and individual victims the stress and 
inconvenience of participating in a trial. Additionally, the offender may 
also be able to do something of a reparative character by assisting with 
the apprehension and/or conviction of another offender.110 In some 
cases, a guilty plea, especially if coupled with other forms of 
cooperation with the authorities, may go a long way toward satisfying 
reparations obligations. But in other cases, especially those involving 
more seriously victimizing offenses, these sorts of reparations may 
seem rather meager. 
Then, too, there is the need for the atoning offender to 
demonstrate a commitment to reform. Again, a lack of time and 
 
 106. O’Hear, supra note 104, at 478 (drug treatment courts); Paul H. 
Robinson, Restorative Processes & Doing Justice, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 421, 428 
(2006) (restorative justice programs). 
 107. In a similar vein, Bibas and Bierschbach argue, “[b]y the time of 
sentencing, criminal procedures have done little to encourage repentance, apology to 
victims, or coming to terms with one’s guilt.” Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 16, at 
98. 
 108. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 85. 
 109. Such considerations, as well as the burdens of preparing for trial and 
sentencing, may also rule out reparations in the form of community or other service. 
 110. See Simons, supra note 16, at 50 (discussing such cooperation as a form 
of reparation). 
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resources may present prohibitive obstacles. In order to initiate a period 
of self-conscious reform, some offenders may require considerable time 
to move beyond the feelings of shame, resentment, and anxiety 
triggered by the offense, arrest, and criminal proceedings. Likewise, 
some offenders may need social services, such as treatment for drug 
dependency, to support their efforts at self-reform—services that 
require time or resources that may not be available pre-sentencing. 
Compliance with jail rules and/or conditions of pretrial release may 
help to establish a commitment to reform, but the meaningfulness of 
this good conduct will be diminished both by its short duration and by 
the close supervision of corrections officials and immediate threat of 
sanctions if rules are broken. 
These practical challenges in providing reparations and achieving 
and demonstrating reform make it difficult for many offenders to 
accomplish atonement in a communicatively powerful way by the time 
of sentencing. The challenges are compounded by the great paradox of 
the acceptance discount: the greater the discount, the harder it is to 
credit the offender’s sincerity.111 Thus, if we were to recognize 
atonement much more generously than we do at sentencing, we might 
make it prohibitively difficult for many offenders to convince us of 
their sincerity and qualify for the benefit.  
Indeed, the structure of the federal discount may conceivably strike 
some sort of optimal balance: we offer a limited, but meaningful, 
discount in recognition of a form of partial atonement whose depth and 
sincerity we do not probe with great rigor; if we offered a greater 
discount, we might find ourselves in the Catch-22 of needing greater 
reassurances of sincerity while simultaneously disabling offenders from 
providing such reassurance. 
D. Atonement and the Good-Time Puzzle 
One response to this line of thinking would be to say “the 
acceptance discount recognizes the communicative significance of 
atonement as well as can be done within the practical constraints of the 
 
 111. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 16, at 189 (“To the degree we give rewards 
for goodness of character, then to that same degree do we give wrongdoers incentives 
to fake goodness of character.”). Murphy argues against giving a sentence discount 
based on remorse or apology because crediting dubious apologies may “cheapen the 
currency of the real thing and add to the cynicism about our system of criminal law.” 
Id. at 194. In rejoinder, though, Susan Bandes observes that Murphy’s argument may 
prove too much: “[t]he legal system is irrevocably in the business of determining 
sincerity and credibility.” Susan A. Bandes, Evaluation of Remorse Is Here to Stay: 
We Should Focus on Improving Its Dynamics, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 
supra note 16, at 198, 198. 
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criminal justice system,” and leave it at that. But this response would 
ignore the communicative possibilities of what happens in the system 
after sentence is imposed. To be sure, there is something uniquely 
compelling and communicatively rich about the direct, personal 
encounter between the offender and the judge at sentencing. Nothing 
that happens afterwards is likely to command as much attention and to 
“speak” with as much clarity to the offender’s wrongdoing and his 
efforts to make amends. Yet, to say that the opportunities for 
communication are in some respects more limited is not to say that they 
are absent altogether. In particular, the way that the offender conducts 
himself while serving his sentence can be seen as a response—either 
positive or negative—to the message communicated by the sentence that 
the offender has done wrong and ought to make amends. 
If the offender’s in-prison conduct is seen in this light, then we can 
see good-time decisions as a continuation of the dialogue regarding the 
offender’s atonement that has begun at sentencing. And there are good 
reasons to favor continuing the dialogue: doing so helps to address 
some of the deficiencies of the acceptance discount as a way to 
recognize atonement. The basic advantage offered by good time is that 
it permits consideration of atonement over a much longer time scale, 
providing the offender with opportunities to develop a deeper 
appreciation of his wrongdoing and to make additional efforts to make 
amends. 
Most importantly, good time can help to communicate a 
commitment to reform. True, the prison environment is quite different 
in many respects from the outside world, and many of the prison rules 
that must be complied with reflect idiosyncratic institutional needs and 
preferences, rather than general principles of good social conduct. But 
other rules, particularly the more important ones whose violation is 
most likely to result in significant losses of good time, either embody 
general criminal prohibitions (e.g., bans on physical violence or 
possession of controlled substances) or have an obvious, direct 
relationship to basic concerns of physical safety (e.g., bans on the 
possession of weapons or unhygienic activities that are likely to spread 
disease). Compliance with such rules can be understood as the 
expression of a commitment to show more regard in the future for the 
well-being of others. More generally, compliance with prison rules 
over time—even those that seem arbitrary—can be understood as the 
expression of a commitment to heed lawful authority. Such expressions 
help, to borrow Radzick’s characterizations of atonement, to “disarm” 
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the threats made by the offender through the offense112 and to “create 
the conditions in which . . . reconciliation can take place.”113 
Although similar, this is not quite the same thing as the argument 
about incapacitation and rehabilitation that Jacobs rejected. The point is 
not that the inmate who behaves himself inside prison is necessarily a 
safe bet on the outside. Rather, the point is that good conduct signals 
that the offender is not consumed by feelings of resentment and 
defiance toward his punishment and has a capacity and a desire to do 
better. We understand that the offender will face a very different set of 
temptations, pressures, and opportunities outside prison, and that 
positive attitudes in prison may not translate into positive actions on the 
outside.114 The expression of the positive attitude in prison nonetheless 
warrants recognition—for much the same reasons as the apology at 
sentencing warrants recognition, even though we well understand that it 
is no guarantee of better conduct in the future. The message conveyed 
by the offender’s conduct permits us to moderate or discontinue our 
punishment of the offender without thereby communicating a message 
of disrespect for our social and legal norms. Relative to the offender 
whose in-prison behavior reflects a continued attitude of norm-defiance, 
we can more fully permit ourselves to view the offender who performs 
well in prison as addressing the communicative harms of his 
wrongdoing. 
Indeed, the offender who performs well in prison has indicated a 
desire and a capacity to reform in what is apt to be the most meaningful 
way available to him. We owe it to him and to ourselves to respond in 
some positive fashion, in the same way that we ought to respond 
positively to acceptance of responsibility at sentencing.115 A reduction 
in sentence length seems an appropriate way to make such a positive 
response to good conduct, inasmuch as the severity of the sentence is 
 
 112. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 94–95. 
 113. Id. at 82–83. I’ve focused particularly on the communicative value of 
good time, but it may also be possible to think of good time as a more material form of 
reparations insofar as it contributes to efficient prison administration. We might 
conceive of this as a form of compensation to the community for the resources that the 
community was required to expend in order to address the underlying wrongdoing 
(e.g., the time of law-enforcement and court personnel, or the costs of social services 
provided to victims at public expense), and perhaps more broadly for the costs of 
increased perceptions of crime risk (e.g., the costs of alarm systems and property 
insurance). 
 114. It may help to appreciate that, even if an apologizing offender recidivates, 
this does not necessarily mean that the apology was dishonest. See Murphy, supra note 
16, at 188 (“The wrongdoer can be self-deceptive or just honestly mistaken about the 
sincerity of his own repentance, and even the sincerely repentant wrongdoer can suffer 
from weak will.”). 
 115. See supra text accompanying note 104. 
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intended to communicate a message of condemnation that no longer 
need be made so forcefully.  
Atonement theory thus provides a potential justification for good 
time and helps us to understand why good time has proven such a 
durable part of the American penal landscape. I do not claim that this 
justification has been a fully worked out part of the thought process of 
our policymakers, but I am suggesting that there may be a widely 
shared, if largely inchoate, intuition that offenders who conform to the 
difficult regimen of prison life deserve reduced sentences—that offering 
such sentence reductions “sends the right message,” a message that we 
hope and expect that offenders will reform themselves and be 
reconciled to the community. Something of this same intuition can 
perhaps also be seen in the popularity of drug treatment courts and 
restorative justice programs.116  
This intuition also has interesting echoes in two quite recent 
Supreme Court decisions. First, in Graham v. Florida,117 the Court 
overturned on Eighth Amendment grounds a defendant’s sentence of 
life without parole.118 In so doing, the Court specifically invoked 
atonement as something the state should encourage and recognize: 
Terrance Graham’s sentence guarantees he will die in prison 
without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no 
matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he 
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true 
character, even if he spends the next half century attempting 
to atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes. The State 
has denied him any chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to 
rejoin society based solely on a nonhomicide crime that he 
committed while he was a child in the eyes of the law. This 
the Eighth Amendment does not permit.119 
Second, in Pepper v. United States,120 the Court again emphasized 
the importance of taking into account what the defendant does after 
sentencing, ruling that a defendant’s positive post-sentencing conduct 
may be considered when the defendant’s sentence is overturned on 
 
 116. For a communicative account of drug treatment courts, see Michael M. 
O’Hear, Drug Treatment Courts as Communicative Punishment, in RETRIBUTIVISM HAS 
A PAST, HAS IT A FUTURE? 234 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011). For a communicative 
account of restorative justice processes, see DUFF, supra note 96, at 96–99. 
 117. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 2033–34. 
 119. Id. at 2033. 
 120. 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). 
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appeal and the case is remanded for a resentencing.121 The Court 
observed, “Pepper’s exemplary postsentencing conduct may be taken as 
the most accurate indicator of ‘his present purposes and tendencies and 
significantly to suggest the period of restraint and the kind of discipline 
that ought to be imposed upon him.’”122  
Neither Graham nor Pepper offers a fully worked-out theory of 
atonement, of course, but both decisions resonate in many ways with 
the justification I have proposed for good time. 
E. Responding to Objections 
Viewing good time in terms of atonement offers a solution to the 
good-time puzzle. But is it really appropriate to view good time in this 
way? In this Section, I will address a few potential objections.  
First, the positive message of reform conveyed by good conduct is 
admittedly qualified by the particular institutional realities of prison 
life, especially the system of close surveillance and swift discipline. 
Still, it is easy to overstate the extent to which prisons are institutions 
of total external control,123 and high rates of some forms of criminality 
in prison (such as sexual assault) provide good evidence of the 
contrary.124 Moreover, even outside prison our lives are subject to 
surveillance and threats of penal sanctions. We do not limit membership 
in our political communities to saints or angels whose internal 
motivations to do the right thing are so unflaggingly strong that external 
controls are wholly unnecessary. Thus, even against a backdrop of 
external controls, we can still regard rule-abiding behavior in prison as 
saying something positive about the offender’s capacity and desire to be 
restored to regular membership in the community. 
Second, good conduct in prison and acceptance of responsibility at 
sentencing are potentially distinguishable from one another based on the 
public nature of the latter; it might be argued that good conduct cannot 
effectively communicate a commitment to reform to the community 
because the conduct occurs out of sight of the community. But the 
distinction may not be as important as first appears. Although 
sentencings are in principle open to the community, few attract 
widespread attention; we are normally content to allow the judge to 
 
 121. Id. at 1241. 
 122. Id. at 1242–43 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 
51, 55 (1937)). 
 123. Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. 
REV. 407, 434–35 (2008). 
 124. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing high sexual assault rates on sexual 
minorities in prison). 
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serve as the community’s representative. The prison officials 
monitoring behavior in prison, who belong to a politically accountable 
branch of government, might likewise be thought of as community 
representatives. Moreover, good-conduct decisions, like sentencing 
decisions, become matters of public record.125 As a practical matter, 
prison conduct may be hardly less available to the wider community 
than sentencing-related conduct. 
Finally, and most importantly, there is a broad philosophical 
objection to the whole notion that the state should take atonement 
considerations into account when setting (or revising) levels of penal 
severity: atonement, it might be argued, is a matter of private 
conscience and private relationships, and lies beyond the permissible 
regard of the liberal state. Plainly, it would indeed be improper for the 
state to use brainwashing or unrestrained brute force to impose on 
offenders a change of heart or reconciliation with victims. Yet, as 
communicative theorists have argued, it is not necessarily unacceptably 
illiberal to punish in the hope of sending a message that the offender 
has done wrong and is expected to undertake reform; such punishment, 
although necessarily coercive in some respects, may nonetheless 
instantiate a respect for the core liberal values of freedom and 
equality.126 Indeed, not punishing might be more illiberal than 
punishing, insofar as such a failure might be understood as an implicit 
rejection of the offender’s moral agency or an implicit endorsement of 
the denigration of the victim’s equal moral status. 
If we are to reconcile the liberal ideals of freedom and equality 
with the use of punishment that seeks reform and reconciliation, Duff 
argues that punishment must aim to persuade offenders in a way that 
leaves them the “freedom to remain unpersuaded.”127 Thus, as he puts 
it, we may force offenders to hear the message that punishment aims to 
communicate, but we may not force them to listen to it.128 In more 
practical terms, sentences should not be extended indefinitely for 
offenders who remain unrepentant,129 but some additional punishment 
may be imposed on offenders who willfully fail to comply with the 
 
 125. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(5) (Supp. 2011) (requiring 
prior notice to local State’s Attorney prior to early release of inmate based on good 
time and posting of information about such inmates on the Internet). 
 126. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 163–64. There are, to be sure, different 
varieties of liberalism, and some are easier to reconcile with the atonement model than 
others. See Garvey, supra note 16, at 1856–58 (“Perfectionist liberalism can therefore 
embrace atonement; neutralist liberalism can’t.”). 
 127. DUFF, supra note 96, at 135. 
 128. Id. at 126. 
 129. Id. at 122. 
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terms of their punishment130—this does not necessarily take away from 
offenders the freedom to choose how to respond to the message that 
punishment aims to communicate. 
To be sure, it is far from certain how much additional punishment 
can be imposed without violating the offender’s freedom to remain 
unpersuaded—without crossing the line from merely forcing the 
offender to hear our message into the forbidden zone of forcing the 
offender actually to listen. For instance, in the good-time setting, by 
how much can incarceration be extended based on prison rule violations 
in the hope of focusing the offender’s attention on his need to atone? 
No mathematically precise answer seems possible. 
Whatever the outer limits of permissible incremental incarceration, 
we may take some reassurance in the limitations routinely imposed in 
practice. Because the amount of possible good time is normally less 
than half of the total sentence length, even a loss of all of an inmate’s 
good time would do no worse than effectively double the length of 
incarceration, and in most states would do much less than that. And 
this, of course, assumes a loss of all good time; however, prison 
officials have considerable discretion to impose lesser sanctions, and in 
many states are even able to restore lost good time.131  
Moreover, if the basic concern here is that atonement-based 
approaches threaten freedom of conscience, we should also bear in 
mind that, while we might be willing to regard good conduct as 
indicative of a genuine change of heart, the process of awarding and 
taking away good time is generally a routinized, bureaucratic process 
that does not imply a searching inquiry into the state of an inmate’s 
soul. We can regard both good time and acceptance as efforts to strike 
a balance—both communicating a message about our hopes for reform 
and reconciliation, but also leaving a certain zone of privacy intact by 
not inquiring too rigorously (that is, illiberally) into those aspects of 
atonement that are most internal. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR GOOD-TIME LAW AND PRACTICE 
If I am correct, then certain widely shared intuitions about 
atonement help to account for the durability of good time. Yet, 
although good time can in theory be seen as a way to recognize 
atonement, current good time laws hardly implement this ideal in an 
optimally coherent or transparent manner. In this Part, I will suggest 
four ways that good-time programs might be reframed or redesigned so 
as to better embody the atonement model. 
 
 130. Id. at 152. 
 131. See supra Part I.A. 
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First, the rhetoric surrounding incarceration and good time might 
more clearly highlight atonement considerations. Although there are 
many moments at which such a change might be implemented, a 
particular point of focus might be the judge’s words at the time a 
sentence of imprisonment is imposed, for this is a moment at which the 
attention of the offender, the victim, their supporters, and sometimes 
the wider community is likely to be drawn in especially powerful ways 
to the offender’s punishment. Imagine, for instance, if the judge said 
something to this effect immediately after announcing a lengthy prison 
term: 
 In our society, prison is often thought to be a place 
where nothing constructive happens, where inmates simply, 
passively wait out the expiration of their terms and have no 
meaningful choices to make. But, in reality, prison is a place 
where important choices are made every single day. I don’t 
want to suggest it is easy, but inmates can indeed use their 
prison time constructively. I and your other fellow citizens 
hope that you will use your time well. 
 For instance, while you are in prison, you are likely to 
have opportunities at some point for education, employment, 
and counseling. You will have to choose whether to take 
advantage of such opportunities, and then choose many times 
thereafter whether to work hard and make the most of those 
opportunities. If you make the right choices, though, you will 
send a powerful message to your fellow citizens that you 
genuinely wish to return as a productive member of the 
community and to avoid future criminal activity. 
 I understand, though, that the opportunities for 
education, employment, and counseling in prison may not be 
as good as you and I might wish. But I would like for you to 
appreciate that these are not the only ways for you to make 
positive choices while you are in prison. Whether you are in a 
program or not, you will have to make choices every day that 
will either contribute to or detract from the safety and order 
of the prison community. If you make the right choices and 
follow the rules while you are inside, you will send a message 
that you are taking greater responsibility for your actions and 
that you are trying to prepare for a successful return to the 
community. 
 A few minutes ago, as I was explaining why I selected 
the sentence I did, I told you that I took into account your 
efforts so far to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for 
your offense. But for a serious offense, like yours, true 
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acceptance of responsibility requires more than words; it must 
be demonstrated through positive conduct over a long period 
of time. I invite you to think of your time in prison as an 
opportunity for you to give life to the words of apology you 
have spoken in this courtroom. This may be an important step 
in your efforts to make amends for the wrong you have done. 
 Again, using your incarceration time constructively in 
this way will not be easy. But, by doing so over a period of 
time, you will show that you deserve to return to the 
community. In fact, as you may know, your efforts to make 
the right choices in prison will be recognized through the 
award of good-time credits, which may reduce your term of 
imprisonment by as much as years. If you do the hard work 
that is necessary to truly earn those credits, then you will 
indeed deserve an early return. 
Analogous messages might be delivered at the reception center 
when new inmates enter prison and periodically thereafter through the 
term of imprisonment. A public announcement along these lines might 
also be made when an offender is released early due to good-time 
credits. 
Second, the link between good time and the acceptance of 
responsibility discount might be formalized, even beyond the rhetorical 
connection suggested above. This would probably require changes to 
sentencing law. For instance, the sentencing judge might be instructed 
to announce the prison term in two ways, both with and without 
whatever acceptance discount the judge concludes is appropriate. The 
difference would constitute a contingent sentence credit that could be 
partially or fully withdrawn by prison officials as a sanction for serious, 
willful rule violations, on the theory that prison misconduct constitutes 
something of a repudiation of acceptance. Folded into the acceptance 
discount this way, a good-time program would in effect become a “bad-
time” program. Acceptance discounts might then be increased a bit to 
offset the lost opportunity for additional sentence reductions based on 
good time.132 
 
 132. One potential drawback is that there would not be much of an opportunity 
to recognize the in-prison conduct of offenders who do not receive a large acceptance 
discount; they would have no contingent benefit that would vest based on good conduct. 
There is, to be sure, a justification for treating differently those who demonstrate 
acceptance by the time of sentencing from those who do not. See supra Part III.B. Still, 
there are legitimate concerns about making large swings in sentence length so 
dependent on performance at the sentencing hearing. See O’Hear, supra note 58, at 
1548–53 (discussing risk that acceptance discount may be lost based on mental illness 
and other factors that should not directly affect sentence severity). For that reason, it 
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Third, the atonement model should cause us to question the 
categorical exclusion of certain inmates from good-time credit in many 
states. Most importantly, there are the exclusions for certain inmates 
who have committed violent or sexual offenses.133 To be sure, the most 
serious victimizing offenses demand the most by way of atonement, and 
in some cases full atonement may not even be possible.134 Yet, there 
seems to be nothing in the atonement model that would categorically 
rule out any meaningful degree of atonement for particular types of 
offenses. For that reason, the federal acceptance of responsibility 
guideline is correct not to make any distinctions based on offense 
type.135 Good-time programs would do well to follow the guideline’s 
lead in this respect. 
One imagines that the categorical exclusions have arisen from a 
fear that good-time credits will drop sentence lengths for serious crimes 
below what is minimally acceptable from the standpoint of either the 
proportionality ideal or the desire to incapacitate the most truly 
dangerous. A better way to address such concerns would be through 
greater transparency and predictability in sentencing and good-time 
decisions. In particular, sentencing guidelines could be designed around 
good-time programs to ensure that minimal length requirements are 
respected in the most serious cases. Additionally, as to incapacitation 
needs specifically, policymakers and the public should bear in mind the 
widespread availability of indefinite civil commitment for the most 
dangerous sex offenders at the expiration of their prison terms.136 
Fourth, and finally, the grounds for denial or loss of good time 
should be tightened up. The focus ought to be on serious, persistent, 
willful misconduct that seems fundamentally inconsistent with 
acceptance of responsibility and a willingness to engage with 
imprisonment in a constructive, atoning way. In this vein, Jacobs’ 
criticism of good-time laws in 1982 remains equally valid as to most or 
all of the current statutes; the laws give too much discretion to prison 
officials and do not sufficiently narrow the grounds for denial or 
 
might be helpful to give offenders who received little or no acceptance discount the first 
time around an opportunity to petition the sentencing court for an acceptance 
redetermination after there has been a significant period of good conduct in prison. 
 133. States with such exclusions include Alabama, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, 
New York, and Rhode Island. See infra Appendix. Several other states, including 
Illinois, Maryland, and Washington, permit good time for such inmates, but at a much 
reduced rate. See infra Appendix. 
 134. RADZIK, supra note 15, at 84. 
 135. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2010). 
 136. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Sexual Predator Laws: A Two-
Decade Retrospective, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 90, 91 (2008) (noting that twenty states 
and the federal government adopted civil commitment laws for sexually violent 
predators beginning in 1990). 
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forfeiture of credits.137 Although none of the statutes seem fully 
satisfactory in this regard, a few seem to have something of the right 
idea, such as New Hampshire’s (“serious act of misconduct or 
insubordination, or persistent refusal to conform to prison 
regulations”)138 and South Dakota’s (“conduct evincing an intent to 
reoffend or commit further offenses when discharged”);139 these 
provide hope for more widespread reform. Also hopeful is the fact that 
some state departments of corrections have already substantially 
cabined official discretion through the adoption of detailed 
administrative regulations governing the denial or loss of good time.140 
Of particular concern, though, are the states that deny or take 
away good time on the basis of the filing of a frivolous claim in a 
prisoner rights lawsuit.141 A frivolous claim need not be willful; indeed, 
given the lack of legal representation for prisoners,142 the risk of 
inadvertent errors seems high. Moreover, a frivolous claim, by its 
nature, should be easy to defend and adjudicate; there seems little harm 
to warrant such a harsh response as a loss of good time. Finally, we 
ought to be concerned about the potential chilling of meritorious claims 
of abuse or unlawful prison conditions; it hardly seems consistent to 
diminish the accountability of prison officials at the same time that we 
are trying to instill a greater sense of accountability among inmates. 
CONCLUSION 
Three decades ago, Professor Jacobs posed an important challenge 
not merely to the design of good-time laws, but to the fairness of the 
basic concept. He invited us to consider the perspective of the offender 
who is denied or loses good time due to a rule violation that would not 
result in a sentence of imprisonment if committed by someone on the 
outside. In these circumstances, Jacobs asked, how can we justify a 
good-time decision that has the effect of increasing the inmate’s term of 
imprisonment?  
The answer, from the perspective of the atonement model, is that 
the inmate and the civilian are quite differently situated. The inmate’s 
 
 137. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803(1)(a) (Supp. 2012) (“bad 
behavior”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(c) (Supp. 2011) (“bad conduct”). 
 138. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:22(IV)(b) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
 139. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 24-2-18 (2004 & Supp. 2011). 
 140. See, e.g., WYO. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY AND PROCEDURE #1.500: 
INMATE GOOD TIME 9–13 (2010), available at 
http://corrections.wy.gov/Media.aspx?mediaId=50. 
 141. See supra note 27. 
 142. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1654–57 
(2003). 
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underlying offense has delivered an insult and a threat to the 
community, and the negative messages remain in place as long as the 
inmate fails to atone for his wrongdoing. Against this backdrop, rule-
breaking in prison reinforces the negative messages of the original 
offense and thus warrants a reinforcement of the community’s penal 
response to the original offense. Perpetrated by a civilian, the same 
conduct would either not carry any particular message regarding the 
civilian’s views of the community and its norms, or, at worst, would 
carry a negative message of less resonance because it is not joined with 
some other earlier, still-unaddressed wrongdoing. The communicative 
character of the conduct varies depending on the circumstances, which 
justifies different penal treatment.143 
The line of thinking here suggests a broader point for punishment 
theory. It is easy to recognize the sentencing hearing as a dialogue of 
sorts between the offender and the judge, speaking as the voice of the 
community. Many commentators have seen the offender-judge 
confrontation at sentencing as a crucial source of moral meaning and 
justification for the punishment that follows.144 Yet, important though it 
may be, this dialogue is also deeply unsatisfactory in some respects. 
The offender speaks, but it is difficult under the circumstances to fully 
credit what he says. Then, the judge pronounces the sentence. Her 
word is the last word, and we are left to speculate as to what meaning 
the sentence carries for the offender and how the offender will engage 
with his punishment. 
However, if we look beyond the sentencing hearing itself, we may 
see additional opportunities to continue the dialogue. To be sure, those 
opportunities are much constrained by our society’s almost reflexive 
tendency to imprison its offenders. Yet, even when the offender is 
incarcerated, the dialogue may continue. I have tried to show how this 
 
 143. The analysis is more complicated if we imagine a civilian with a criminal 
record; in such a case, the fresh misconduct by the civilian will carry some of the 
negative resonance of the inmate’s misconduct, which might cast doubt on the 
appropriateness of different treatment. On the other hand, if the ex-con is still on 
parole, there may not be much of a functional difference in the treatment: the parolee’s 
misconduct can lead to the revocation of parole and hence what is in effect an extension 
of imprisonment without the benefit of normal trial procedures. If the ex-con is no 
longer on parole, we must assume that a relatively long time has elapsed since the 
original offense, which suggests that the insult and threat of the original offense may be 
considerably attenuated; if so, this attenuation might justify different treatment for the 
ex-con than for the inmate. At the same time, the operation of recidivism-based 
sentence enhancements may make the practical differences in treatment less dramatic 
than might first appear to be the case. 
 144.  KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 81–82 (1998). 
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might happen through a good-time program. Similar points might be 
made about parole and clemency.145  
What I suggest here cuts against a view of the prison as a place of 
exile and utter apartness—a place where neither dialogue nor any other 
kind of meaningful engagement can occur with the wider community. 
Although common, this view does not exhaust the possibilities. For 
instance, I have elsewhere described at length Justice John Paul 
Stevens’ vision of the prison as a place where inmates retain their 
connectedness to the outside world—a connectedness that helps to 
support and inspire their efforts at self-reform.146 
It is important, I think, to hold onto this more connected, 
constructive vision of the prison experience. If we see prisoners as 
wholly removed from the community, on what basis do we permit their 
return? How is the exile—a person who is definitionally cut off from 
his erstwhile fellow citizens—ever to make amends? Absent atonement, 
there might eventually be release from prison, but not reconciliation. 
And release without reconciliation seems a fearful prospect for both 
offenders and the communities to which they return.147 
It is, of course, no good merely to say that the prison experience 
should be viewed in more connected, constructive ways if the reality of 
the situation is moving sharply in the opposite direction. I have argued 
elsewhere that punishment theorists who decry the increasing harshness 
of American sentences—and that would be the vast majority of 
punishment theorists—ought to devote more attention to the 
conceptualization and structuring of the prison experience, rather than 
simply bemoaning the fact that we have so many prisoners.148 
Rethinking and reforming good time (and, for that matter, parole and 
clemency) along atonement lines might be a good first step. 
 
 145. See O’Hear, supra note 65 (proposing theory of parole along these lines); 
cf. Murphy, supra note 16, at 191 (arguing that remorse and repentance should be 
recognized through clemency). Although a less familiar device than parole and 
clemency, judicial sentence modification would also provide another opportunity to 
continue the dialogue. For a description of this device, see Klingele, supra note 33, at 
498–512. 
 146. O’Hear, supra note 65, at 1272–76. 
 147. Indeed, it is possible that the elimination or scaling back in many 
jurisdictions over the past generation of programs like parole and good time that 
encourage and recognize atonement has contributed to the adoption of a host of new 
laws that seem to reflect deep anxieties about returning prisoners, from three-strikes 
laws and other harsh mandatory minimums for recidivists to civil commitment statutes 
to sex-offender registration requirements to mandatory deportation and so forth. Such 
laws have, of course, proven immensely costly in both fiscal and human terms. 
Klingele, supra note 33, at 469–70. 
 148. O’Hear, supra note 65, at 1286–87. 
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APPENDIX: STATES WITH GOOD-TIME PROGRAMS FOR PRISON 
INMATES149 
 Maximum 
Reduction in 
Term 
Statutory Exclusions Grounds for Denial or Loss of Credit 
AL 75 days per 
30 days 
served150 
Class A felons 
Inmates sentenced to 
death, life, or more 
than 15 years 
Sex offenders with 
child victim151 
Offense or rule violation152  
 
AK One-third of 
term153 
Inmates sentenced to 
mandatory 99-year 
term; repeat sex 
offenders154 
Offense or rule violation155 
CO 15 days per 
month156 
 Credit “shall not vest and may be 
withheld or deducted.”157 
CT 12 days per 
month158 
 “Misconduct or refusal to obey the 
rules . . . .”159 
DE 3 days per 
month160 
Inmates sentenced to 
life or as habitual 
criminals 
Certain others at 
judge’s discretion161 
Offense or rule violation 
Assault on correctional personnel 
Frivolous lawsuit162 
 
 149. This list excludes good-time programs designed for jail inmates and 
parolees. The list also excludes earned-time programs, in which credit toward early 
release is obtained by virtue of successful participation in specified programs or 
activities. Finally, the list excludes states that have recently eliminated good time for 
new inmates, even though a number of current inmates may still be eligible for good 
time under the old system. 
 150. ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(a) (2011). This credit is available to Class I 
prisoners. Lesser credits are available to other classes of prisoners, with no credit at all 
for Class IV prisoners. § 14-9-41(a)(1)-(4).  
 151. § 14-9-41(e). 
 152. § 14-9-41(f)(1). 
 153. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20.010(a) (2010). 
 154. § 33.20.010(a)(1)-(3). 
 155. § 33.20.050. 
 156. COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-301(1) (2006). 
 157. § 17-22.5-301(3). 
 158. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-7a(c) (2006). In the first five years, only ten days 
per month can be earned. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4381(c)(2) (Supp. 2010). In the first year, only 
two days per month can be earned. § 4381(c)(1). 
 161. § 4381(b). 
 162. § 4382(a)-(c), (e). 
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 Maximum 
Reduction in 
Term 
Statutory Exclusions Grounds for Denial or Loss of Credit 
IL 1 day per 
day163 
Inmates convicted of 
first-degree murder or 
terrorism164 
Inmates sentenced to 
death or life165 
Rule violation166 
Frivolous lawsuit167 
 
KS 20 percent of 
term168 
Inmates convicted of 
capital or 
premeditated first-
degree murder169 
Maladjustment, failure to cooperate 
in development of release plan, 
offense, or rule violation170 
Frivolous lawsuit or other abusive 
litigation practices171 
KY 10 days per 
month172 
 An offense or a rule violation173  
Frivolous lawsuit174 
LA 35 days per 
30 days175 
Inmates convicted of 
listed violent or sex 
offense176 
Inmates sentenced as 
habitual offenders, or 
(at trial court 
discretion) convicted 
of stalking177 
Escape, battery of a corrections 
employee or police officer, or rule 
violation178 
Frivolous lawsuit or other abusive 
litigation practices179 
 
 163. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (2010). This is the general rule, but 
there are a number of specific offenses for which good time is more limited, most 
commonly to 4.5 days per month. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(2). 
 164. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i).  
 165. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(2.2). 
 166. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(5)(c). 
 167. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(5)(d). 
 168. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 44-6-114e(a) (2009). For some classes of offenses, 
the maximum credit is fifteen percent of the prison term. § 44-6-114e(b). 
 169. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(b)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2010). 
 170. § 44-6-115a(d)-(g). 
 171. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6821(d)(1)-(5) (Supp. 2011). 
 172. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.045(1)(b)1. (West Supp. 2011). 
 173. § 197.045(2). 
 174. § 197.045(5)(a). 
 175. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.3(B)(1)(a) (Supp. 2011). Certain prisoners 
convicted of a crime of violence earn credit at the rate of three days for every seventeen 
days in actual custody. § 15:571.3(B)(2)(a).  
 176. § 15:571.3(C)(1), (4). 
 177. § 15:571.3(C)(2)-(3), (5).  
 178. § 15:571.4(B)-(C). 
 179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1190 (2005). 
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 Maximum 
Reduction in 
Term 
Statutory Exclusions Grounds for Denial or Loss of Credit 
ME 4 days per 
month180 
Inmates convicted of a 
listed crime of 
violence or sex 
offense, or of a 
domestic offense181 
Offense or rule violation182 
MD 10 days per 
month183 
 Rule violation184 
MA 7.5 days per 
month185 
 Infraction186 
Frivolous lawsuit or other abusive 
litigation practices187 
MI 5 days per 
month188 
 “Major misconduct”189 
Frivolous lawsuit190 
MO 2 months per 
year191 
Inmates sentenced as 
persistent sexual 
offenders and certain 
other recidivists192 
Offense or rule violation193 
NV 20 days per 
month194 
Class A and B felons 
Inmates convicted of a 
listed crime of 
violence or sex 
offense195 
Offense 
Assault 
“Flagrant disregard” of rules or of 
“terms and conditions of 
confinement” 
Frivolous lawsuit or other abusive 
litigation practices196 
 
 180. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1253(9)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2011). 
 181. Id. 
 182. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1253(9)(B). 
 183. MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-704(b)(1)(ii) (LexisNexis 2008). The 
credit is limited to five days per month for inmates convicted of a crime of violence or 
a drug trafficking offense. § 3-704(b)(2).  
 184. § 3-709(a). 
 185. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 129D (2003). The amount of possible 
credits is related to the number of programs or activities in which the inmate 
participates. Id. 
 186. 103 MASS. CODE REGS. § 410.14 (2011). 
 187. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 127, § 129D.  
 188. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 800.33(5) (1998 & Supp. 2011). 
 189. Id. 
 190. § 800.33(15). 
 191. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 14, § 10-5.010(2)(A) (Supp. 2011). 
 192. MO. REV. STAT. § 558.041(1) (2011). 
 193. § 558.041(3). 
 194. NEV. REV. STAT § 209.4465(1) (2011). 
 195. § 209.4465(8). 
 196. § 209.451(1). 
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 Maximum 
Reduction in 
Term 
Statutory Exclusions Grounds for Denial or Loss of Credit 
NH 12.5 days 
per month197 
 Escape 
“[S]erious act of misconduct or 
insubordination, or persistent refusal 
to conform to prison regulations”198 
NJ 16 days per 
month199 
 “Flagrant misconduct”200 
Frivolous lawsuit201 
NY One-third of 
term202 
Inmates sentenced to 
life203 
Certain A-I felons and 
other inmates 
convicted of listed 
crime of violence or 
sex offense204 
“[B]ad behavior, violation of 
institutional rules or failure to 
perform properly in the duties or 
program assigned”205 
NC 1 day per 
day206 
Only available for 
inmates convicted of 
impaired driving207 
 
Rule violation208 
 
OK 60 days per 
month209 
Inmates whose offense 
resulted in death of a 
law-enforcement or 
corrections officer210 
“[M]isconduct, nonperformance or 
disciplinary action”211 
OR 20 percent of 
term212 
 Major rule violation213 
 
 197. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:22(III) (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
 198. § 651-A:22(IV). 
 199. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-140 (West 2008). This rate applies only to the 
very longest sentences. New Jersey has an unusually complicated system in which many 
fine-grained distinctions are made based on sentence length. On the opposite end of the 
spectrum, inmates with the shortest sentences receive a credit of only seven days per 
month. See id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. § 30:4-16.2(b). 
 202. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803(1)(a) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2012). 
 203. Id. 
 204. § 803(1)(d)(ii). 
 205. § 803(1)(a). 
 206. DIV. OF PRISONS, supra note 30, § .0110(b). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. § .0111(b). 
 209. OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 138(A), (D)(2)(c) (2004 & Supp. 2012). Oklahoma 
has a complicated system in which the maximum available credit varies considerably 
depending on criminal history and inmate classification, which in turn depends in part 
on evaluations received in work, education, and program assignments. § 138(D). 
 210. § 138(A). 
 211. § 138(C). 
 212. OR. REV. STAT. § 421.121(2)(b) (2009). 
 213. OR. ADMIN. R. 291-097-0025(1) (2011).  
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 Maximum 
Reduction in 
Term 
Statutory Exclusions Grounds for Denial or Loss of Credit 
RI 10 days per 
month214 
Inmates sentenced to 
life or for various sex 
offenses215 
“[B]ad conduct, as determined by the 
assistant director . . . .”216 
SC 20 days per 
month217 
Inmates sentenced to 
life or under a 30-year 
mandatory minimum 
statute218 
Offense or rule violation219 
SD 6 months per 
year220 
Inmates sentenced to 
life221 
Recommendation of disciplinary 
committee 
Conduct “evincing an intent to 
reoffend or commit further offenses 
when discharged” 
Failure of sex offender “to fully 
cooperate with all treatment 
offered”222 
TN 8 days per 
month223 
 Commission of “disciplinary 
offense”224 
Multiple frivolous lawsuits225 
TX 30 days per 
30 days226 
 Offense or rule violation227 
Contacting a victim of the crime or a 
victim’s family member if the victim 
was younger than 17228 
Frivolous lawsuit229 
 
 214. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(b) (Supp. 2011).  
 215. § 42-56-24(a). 
 216. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(c) (2006 & Supp. 2011).  
 217. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-210(A) (2007 & Supp. 2011). Inmates serving 
time for “no parole offense[s]” earn good time at the lower rate of three days per 
month. § 24-13-210(B). 
 218. § 24-13-210(B). 
 219. § 24-13-210(D). 
 220. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 24-5-1 (2004). The rate begins in the tenth year; 
prior to that, up to four months per year may be earned. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 24-2-18 (2004 & Supp. 2011). 
 223. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-236(a)(2)(A) (2010). 
 224. § 41-21-236(a)(4). 
 225. § 41-21-816. 
 226. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 498.003(b) (West 2004). This is the rate for a 
trusty; other classes of inmates accrue good time at lesser rates. Id. “Regardless of the 
classification of an inmate, the department may grant good conduct time to the inmate 
only if the department finds that the inmate is actively engaged in an agricultural, 
vocational, or educational endeavor, in an industrial program or other work program, 
or in a treatment program, unless the department finds that the inmate is not capable of 
participating in such a program or endeavor.” § 498.003(a). 
 227. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 498.004(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011). 
 228. § 498.0042. 
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 Maximum 
Reduction in 
Term 
Statutory Exclusions Grounds for Denial or Loss of Credit 
WA 50 percent of 
term230 
 “Serious infraction”231 
WV 1 day per 
day232 
Inmates sentenced to 
life233 
Rule violation234 
Frivolous lawsuit or other abusive 
litigation practices235 
WY 15 days per 
month236 
 
 Inmate’s “attitude, conduct or 
behavior has not been good, proper 
or helpful” or inmate “has not 
adhered to the rules of the facility”237 
 
 
 229. § 498.0045. 
 230. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(c) (2011). Inmates convicted of certain 
serious crimes of violence or sex offenses are limited to ten percent of the sentence. § 
9.94A.729(b). 
 231. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-28-350(1)(l) (2011). 
 232. W. VA. CODE § 28-5-27(c) (2011). 
 233. § 28-5-27(d). 
 234. § 28-5-27(f). 
 235. § 25-1A-6. 
 236. WYO. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 140, at 4. 
 237. Id. at 9. 
